<oai_dc:dc xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:creator>Bacchetta, Philippe</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Tille, Cédric</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Wincoop, Eric van</dc:creator>
  <dc:description xmlns:ns0="xml" ns0:lang="en">&lt;jats:p&gt; There has been a long debate about whether speculators are stabilizing or not. We consider a model where speculators have a stabilizing role in normal times, but may also provoke large risk panics. The very feature that makes arbitrageurs liquidity providers in normal times, namely their tolerance of risk, enables a large increase in asset price risk during a financial panic. We show that a policy that discourages balance sheet risk reduces the magnitude of financial panics, as well as asset price risk in both normal and panic states. &lt;/jats:p&gt;</dc:description>
  <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
  <dc:identifier>https://sonar.ch/global/documents/150725</dc:identifier>
  <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
  <dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/aer.101.3.410</dc:relation>
  <dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/0002-8282</dc:relation>
  <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
  <dc:source>American Economic Review. - American Economic Association. - 2011, vol. 101, no. 3, p. 410-412</dc:source>
  <dc:subject xmlns:ns1="xml" ns1:lang="en">Economics and Econometrics</dc:subject>
  <dc:title xmlns:ns2="xml" ns2:lang="en">Regulating Asset Price Risk</dc:title>
  <dc:type>http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501</dc:type>
</oai_dc:dc>
