<oai_dc:dc xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:creator>Weber, Thomas A.</dc:creator>
  <dc:date>2019</dc:date>
  <dc:description xmlns:ns0="xml" ns0:lang="en">&lt;jats:p&gt; To quantify a player’s commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a “canonical extension,” which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment measure relates to the average overall adjustment probabilities for which the given Nash equilibrium can be implemented as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the canonical extension. &lt;/jats:p&gt;</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>https://sonar.ch/global/documents/80392</dc:identifier>
  <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
  <dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1142/s0219198919400115</dc:relation>
  <dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/0219-1989</dc:relation>
  <dc:source>International Game Theory Review. - World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt. - 2019, vol. 21, no. 02, p. 1940011</dc:source>
  <dc:subject xmlns:ns1="xml" ns1:lang="en">Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject xmlns:ns2="xml" ns2:lang="en">Business and International Management</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject xmlns:ns3="xml" ns3:lang="en">General Computer Science</dc:subject>
  <dc:title xmlns:ns4="xml" ns4:lang="en">Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria</dc:title>
  <dc:type>http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501</dc:type>
</oai_dc:dc>