Practical Key-Recovery Attacks On Round-Reduced Ketje Jr, Xoodoo-AE And Xoodyak
Journal article

Practical Key-Recovery Attacks On Round-Reduced Ketje Jr, Xoodoo-AE And Xoodyak

  • Zhou, Haibo Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University, China
  • Li, Zheng Faculty of Information Technology, Beijing University of Technology, China
  • Dong, Xiaoyang Institute for Advanced Study, Tsinghua University, China
  • Jia, Keting Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, China
  • Meier, Willi FHNW, Switzerland
  • 2020-2-4
Published in:
  • The Computer Journal. - Oxford University Press (OUP). - 2020, vol. 63, no. 8, p. 1231-1246
English Abstract
A new conditional cube attack was proposed by Li et al. at ToSC 2019 for cryptanalysis of Keccak keyed modes. In this paper, we find a new property of Li et al.’s method. The conditional cube attack is modified and applied to cryptanalysis of 5-round Ketje Jr, 6-round Xoodoo-AE and Xoodyak, where Ketje Jr is among the third round CAESAR competition candidates and Xoodyak is a Round 2 submission of the ongoing NIST lightweight cryptography project. For the updated conditional cube attack, all our results are shown to be of practical time complexity with negligible memory cost, and test codes are provided. Notably, our results on Xoodyak represent the first third-party cryptanalysis for Xoodyak.
Language
  • English
Open access status
closed
Identifiers
Persistent URL
https://sonar.ch/global/documents/166388
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