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Building biosecurity for synthetic biology.
Journal article

Building biosecurity for synthetic biology.

  • Trump BD US Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and Development Center, Vicksburg, MS, USA.
  • Galaitsi SE US Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and Development Center, Vicksburg, MS, USA.
  • Appleton E Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA.
  • Bleijs DA Biosecurity Office, Netherlands National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, The Netherlands.
  • Florin MV International Risk Governance Center, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland.
  • Gollihar JD US Army Research Laboratory (ARL), Adelphi, MD, USA.
  • Hamilton RA United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), Turin, Italy.
  • Kuiken T Genetic Engineering & Society Center at North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA.
  • Lentzos F King's College London, London, UK.
  • Mampuys R Netherlands Commission on Genetic Modification (COGEM), Bilthoven, The Netherlands.
  • Merad M French National Centre for Scientific Research, Paris, France.
  • Novossiolova T Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, Bulgaria.
  • Oye K International Risk Governance Center, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland.
  • Perkins E US Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and Development Center, Vicksburg, MS, USA.
  • Garcia-Reyero N US Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and Development Center, Vicksburg, MS, USA.
  • Rhodes C University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK.
  • Linkov I US Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and Development Center, Vicksburg, MS, USA.
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  • 2020-07-22
Published in:
  • Molecular systems biology. - 2020
General Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology
Computational Theory and Mathematics
General Immunology and Microbiology
Applied Mathematics
General Agricultural and Biological Sciences
Information Systems
English The fast-paced field of synthetic biology is fundamentally changing the global biosecurity framework. Current biosecurity regulations and strategies are based on previous governance paradigms for pathogen-oriented security, recombinant DNA research, and broader concerns related to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Many scholarly discussions and biosecurity practitioners are therefore concerned that synthetic biology outpaces established biosafety and biosecurity measures to prevent deliberate and malicious or inadvertent and accidental misuse of synthetic biology's processes or products. This commentary proposes three strategies to improve biosecurity: Security must be treated as an investment in the future applicability of the technology; social scientists and policy makers should be engaged early in technology development and forecasting; and coordination among global stakeholders is necessary to ensure acceptable levels of risk.
Language
  • English
Open access status
gold
Identifiers
Persistent URL
https://sonar.ch/global/documents/230766
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