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Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme
Journal article

Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme

  • Hong, Hao Freddie Mac, Virginia, USA
  • Wong, Tsz-Ning Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Basel, Switzerland
  • 2020-5-5
Published in:
  • Journal of Theoretical Politics. - SAGE Publications. - 2020, vol. 32, no. 3, p. 460-493
Sociology and Political Science
English Authoritarian rule requires teamwork of political elites. However, elite class members may lack incentive for the contribution of their efforts. In this paper, we develop a model to study the decision of authoritarian rulers to introduce elections. Our model suggests that elections can motivate the ruling class to devote more effort to public good provision. As a result, elections alleviate the moral-hazard-in-teams problem within the authoritarian government. Excessive electoral control hinders the introduction of elections, but mild electoral control facilitates it. Our findings offer a new perspective on understanding authoritarian elections and explain many stylized facts in authoritarian regimes.
Language
  • English
Open access status
closed
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Persistent URL
https://sonar.ch/global/documents/231739
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