Journal article
Iterative Versus Standard Deferred Acceptance: Experimental Evidence★
- Bó, Inácio WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Germany
- Hakimov, Rustamdjan Department of Economics, University of Lausanne, Switzerland, and WZB Berlin Social Science Center
- 2019-7-25
Published in:
- The Economic Journal. - Oxford University Press (OUP). - 2019
English
Abstract
We test experimentally the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus two versions of the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), in which students make applications one at a time. A significantly higher proportion of stable outcomes is reached under IDAM than under DA. The difference can be explained by a higher proportion of subjects following an equilibrium truthful strategy under iterative mechanisms than the dominant strategy of truthful reporting under DA. We associate the benefits of iterative mechanisms with the feedback on the outcome of the previous application they provide to students between steps.
- Language
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- English
- Open access status
- closed
- Identifiers
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- DOI 10.1093/ej/uez036
- ISSN 0013-0133
- Persistent URL
- https://sonar.ch/global/documents/293876
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