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The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion
Journal article

The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion

  • Deonna, Julien A. Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences and Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva, Switzerland
  • Scherer, Klaus R. Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, Switzerland,
  • 2009-12-21
Published in:
  • Emotion Review. - SAGE Publications. - 2009, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 44-52
Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
Social Psychology
English Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists (in particular Barrett) seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that these do not qualify as intentional. We argue that these disappearing acts, deliberate or not, generate fruitless debate and add little to the advancement of our understanding of emotion as an adaptive mechanism to cope with events that are relevant to an organism’s life.
Language
  • English
Open access status
closed
Identifiers
Persistent URL
https://sonar.ch/global/documents/77988
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