Journal article
Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria
- Weber, Thomas A. Chair of Operations, Economics and Strategy, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Station 5, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
- 2019-7-10
Published in:
- International Game Theory Review. - World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt. - 2019, vol. 21, no. 02, p. 1940011
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
Business and International Management
General Computer Science
English
To quantify a player’s commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a “canonical extension,” which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment measure relates to the average overall adjustment probabilities for which the given Nash equilibrium can be implemented as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the canonical extension.
- Language
-
- English
- Open access status
- closed
- Identifiers
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- DOI 10.1142/s0219198919400115
- ISSN 0219-1989
- Persistent URL
- https://sonar.ch/global/documents/80392
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